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Banishing Ipse Dixit: The Impact of
Kumho Tire on Forensic Identification Science
Michael J. Saks*
L Introduction
From the viewpoint of conventional science, the forensic identification
sciences are contenders for being the shoddiest science offered to the courts.'
After being in business for nearly a century, they still have developed little
that would be recognized as a scientific foundation and, consequently, have
little basic science to apply to their operational activities. For much of the
twentieth century, the courts readily admitted these fields, apparently because
they were flying the banner of science and not because they presented sound
data supporting their claims. The decision in Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, Inc.2 concluded that the duty of judicial gatekeeping of
expert testimony could be met only if judges were persuaded of the soundness
of an expert's underlying claims.' No one was more surprised than the judges
when they realized that subjecting the forensic identification sciences to
Daubert scrutiny led to the conclusion that they should be excluded.4 Conse-
quently, after Daubert courts began to look for ways to avoid its application
* Professor of Law, Arizona State University.
1. This is, of course, more true of some of them and less true of others. See generally
DAVIDL. FAIeiANET AL, MODERN ScmI Fic EVIDENCE: THELAW AND SCIENCE OFEXPERT
TESTIMONY(1997) [hereinafterFAIGMANETAL.]; John Thornton, The GeneralAssumptions and
Rationale of Forensic Identfiftcation, in 2 MODEN SCIENTFIC EVIDENCE: THE LAW AND
ScIENCE OF EXPERT TESTIMONY § 20 (David L. Faigman at al. eds., 1997); J. Orenstein, Effect
of the Daubert Decision on Document Examinationsfrom theProsecutor'sPerpective, at http'/
www.fbi.gov/programs/lab/fsc/baekissu/octl999/abstrete.htm (June 14-18, 1999) ("Daubert
challenges prosecutors and the QDE [Questioned Document Examiner] community to work
with scholars to develop ways to demonstrate to courts ... that the basic principles of QDE
analysis are scientifically valid... ."). The QDE community has failed "to develop a rigorous
empirical defense of its theories and methods." The reason for this shortcoming is that "forensic
document examiners traditionally had not had any particular reason to conduct validity studies
because their testimony was being admitted without them." Id.
2. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
3. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579,597 (1993) (concluding that
evidence must be based on scientific principles).
4. See United States v. Starzecpyzel, 880 F. Supp. 1027, 1036 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (stating
that "were the court to apply Daubert to FDE [forensic document examination], it would have
to be excluded").
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to the forensic identification sciences. Moreover, some forensic identification
scientists looked for ways to evade Daubert scrutiny. The solution to this
problem for those judges and for pseudo-scientists was to re-classify those
fields as non-science.5 But Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael6 patched that hole,
so to say, at least by its apparent terms.' That is to say, hauling down the
science flag and hoisting the non-science flag does not exempt expert evi-
dence from Daubert scruiny.8
Together, Daubert and Kumho Tire do a remarkably clear job of com-
manding judges to properly scrutinize fields, presumably including the foren-
sic identification sciences, before admitting opinions from those fields'
practitioners. But one can never underestimate the ingenuity of judges in
finding ways to evade rules that tellthem to do something that would lead to
a result contrary to the one suggested by their intuitions. The post-Daubert,
pre-Kumho Tire period was telling: Obeying the letter and spirit of Daubert
would lead to significant exclusion of a type of evidence that the courts
welcomed for most of the twentieth century. On the other hand, a ruling to
admit these fields would be both a rejection of conventional science as the
criterion for admission of empirical claims and a ruling in the teeth of re-
peated unanimous Supreme Court opinions declaring the conventional scien-
tific method to be the touchstone for evaluating empirical claims of all kinds.
The question with which this Article is concerned is: What are the pros-
pects that Kumho Tire will compel courts to follow the commands of Daubert
5. Id.; see discussion infra notes 82-84 and accompanying text (discussing judicial re-
classification of fields as non-scientific) and infra notes 88-89 and accompanying text (noting
fields' own classification of themselves as scientific or not).
6. 526 U.S. 137 (1999).
7. Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137,147-49 (1999). Kumho Tire states:
The initial question before us is whether [Daubert's] basic gatekeeping obliga-
tion applies only to "scientific" testimony or to all expert testimony. We, like the
parties, believe that it applies to all expert testimony...
Finally, it would prove difficult, if not impossible, for judges to administer evi-
dentiary rules under which a gatekeeping obligation depended upon a distinction
between "scientific" knowledge and "technical" or "other specialized" knowledge.
There is no clear line that divides the one from the others....
We conclude that Daubert's general principles apply to the expert matters
described in Rule 702. The Rule, in respect to all such matters, "establishes a
standard of evidentiary reliability." It "requires a valid... connection to the perti-
nent inquiry as a precondition to admissibility."
Id. (citations omitted).
8. See id at 149 (determining that labeling evidence non-scientific may not exempt it
from Dauberttest).
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and to exclude expert opinions "connected to existing data only by the ipse
dixit of the expert"?9
ff. Defining the Fields
Let us be clear about the fields that we are discussing. There are two
kinds of forensic science: On the one hand, there are normal applications of
basic science. On the other hand, there is individualization science, or identi-
fication science. My focus will be on the latter, though it will not be my
exclusive focus. Normal forensic science does things like determining what
substance something is (e.g., what is that white powder?) or measuring the
quantity of something (e.g., how much alcohol is in the murder victim's
blood?). Forensic individualization sciences aim to connect a crime scene
object or mark to the one and only source of that object or mark to the exclu-
sion of all others in the world.
Examples of the forensic identification sciences include handwriting
identification, fingerprints, firearms, toolmarks, bite marks, hair and fiber
identification, tiremarks, footprints, and so on."0 This is a remarkable claim,
especially considering how weak the theoretical and empirical bases of it are.
Yet it is accepted widely in our culture as true. Question: How do the practi-
tioners of these "sciences," or the public that has so long accepted the claims
of expertise, know the claims to be true? The answer is ipse dixit (or ipse
dixit's close cousin, "experience"). Once one appreciates the weakness of the
bases of forensic identification science, one can better understand why the
casualness of judges in admitting these fields creates a serious problem and
how Kumho Tire, if obeyed by the lower courts, could bring about a revolu-
tion in the courts and in forensic science itself."
III The Scientific Status of These Fields
Most of the fields we are discussing did not grow out of basic science.
Police investigators invented these fields to meet a criminal justice system
need, namely, to help figure out who committed a crime and to help win a
conviction. Scientists in university laboratories or in industry did not invent
9. General Elea. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 146 (1997).
10. Although DNA typing is a member of this family, I will omit it from the list because
it is the exception that tests the rule and makes the failings of the others become apparent See
Michael J. Saks & Jonathan J. Koehler, WhatDNA '77ingerprinting" Can Teach the LawAbout
the Rest ofForensic Science, 13 CARDOZO L. REV. 361,362 (1991) (discussing how advances
in DNA fingerprinting will make forensic science more scientific).
11. That is, obeyance could turn the forensic sciences into what they have claimed they
are - sciences. This would cause them to temper their claims and tether them to what is
provable and not merely what is assertable.
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the techniques; instead, police investigators who sometimes were engaged in
little more than a parody of science invented them. 2 Other forensic sciences,
what we might call the "normal forensic sciences" (e.g., forensic toxicology
and forensic chemistry), borrow and apply principles from normal basic
sciences such as physics, chemistry, and biology. Those applications have the
benefit of basic research on which to build.
In seeking to establish pinpoint linkages between crime scene evidence
and known exemplars, the forensic identification sciences seek to accomplish
something that no other field attempts to accomplish and about which no other
field has developed any basic scientific knowledge. The forensic identifica-
tion sciences have no basic science to undergird them. For most of their
history, the forensic identification sciences had little or no academic or
industrial infrastructure to provide them with knowledge, resources, or person-
nel. Instead, they invented themselves, and they exist on their own. They are
an enterprise consisting of nearly all application and no science.
There is no systematic, rigorous, empirical research on whichthe forensic
identification sciences' knowledge is built. If called upon to prove their
claims, theyhave little or no data to marshal in their support. Instead, the
forensic identification sciences point to a guild of mutually self-reassuring
examiners who have come to believe in the truth of their claims, often sound-
ing more like a faith-based religion than a data-based science."
The forensic identification sciences' best theoretical argument is the
multiplication rule of probability theory. But, unlike DNA typing, they gather
no data about base rate probabilities and perform no calculations to reach
conclusions in the cases they work. They merely intuit the improbability of
a coincidental match. Moreover, there is a disconnect in the theory. This
disconnect is between their starting point and the assertions made about what
the field can do. It is impossible to reach pinpoint identification from proba-
bility theory. Probability theory does not lead to the one-of-a-kind, absolute
conclusions that forensic identification scientists generally offer in their
reports and in court.'
4
12. SeegeneralIyJuRGENTHoRWAlDTHECENTURYOFTHEDTECTIVE(1965)(detaifing
historical development of forensics and investigative techniques of detectives); John Thornton,
Criminalisfics - Pas Presen4 Future, 11 LEx ET ScaNTA 1 (1975) (discussing evolution of
criminalistics).
13. For example, asserted handwriting experts routinely testify in Daubert hearings to a
central maxim of their field: "No two people write the same way, and no one person writes the
same way twice." The question neither the witnesses northeir field can answer is: How do they
know these assertions to be true? Constant repetition of an assertion does not make it true ("the
moon is made of green cheese").
14. See, e.g.,HAROLDCUMMTNS&CARIESMIDLO,DEMATOGLYPHICS 154 (1943)("It
is unfortunate that this approach carries the implication that a complete correspondence of two
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Forensic identification science examinations are overwhelmingly subjec-
tive affairs. Armed with no usable models and no base rate data, they must
rely on impressions, subjective probability estimations, and intuition (termed
"judgment" or "experience")."5 Fingerprint identification experts have the
advantage of large organized databases containing sets of previously collected
and entered fingerprints. Their decisions, however, remain highly subjec-
tive.16 Indeed, the field requires experts to be doubly subjective: Not only
must they reach a subjective judgment about the likelihood of a coincidental
match, but they may not testify to an identification unless they believe that
every other fingerprint expert's subjective judgment would render the same
conclusion. Thus, fingerprint examiners must draw subjective impressions
about other people's subjective impressions.
The identification science fields hold various beliefs about the phenom-
ena with which they deal. These beliefs typically are untested. In some in-
stances they are untestable." Tests suggest others to be untrue."8 Neither of
patterns might occur... it is impossible to offer decisive proof that no two fingerprints bear
identical patterns."). See generally David A. Stoney, What Made Us Ever Think We Could
Indimdualize Using Statistics?, 31 J. FoRENsIc SCL Soc'Y 197 (1991).
15. See, e.g., United States v. Starzeepyzel, 880 F. Supp. 1027,1031-36 (S.D.N.Y. 1995)
(explaining how Judge McKenna fried and failed to learn during Daubert hearing how Forensic
Document Examiners (FDEs) reach their conclusions). For another example, consider these
comments by a forensic scientist concerning fingerprint identification: "The criteria for absolute
identification are wholly dependent on the subjective professional judgment of a fingerprint
examiner. When a fingerprint examiner determines that there is enough corresponding detail
to warrant the conclusion of absolute identification, then the criteria have been met" David A.
Stoney, Fingerprint Identification, in 2 MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE, supra note 1, § 21-
2.1.2, at 65. "The criteria for absolute identification in fingerprint work are subjective and ill-
defined. They are the product of probabilistic intuitions widely shared among fingerprint
examiners, not of scientific research. This generally is unappreciated." Id. § 21-2.3.1, at 70.
16. In 1973, the International Association for Identification (IA) declared that there was
"no scientific basis" for adhering to any minimum standard. Instead, the IAI argued that the
criteria for a match should be based on the examiner's expert opinion, rather than some arbitrary
number of points. Simon Cole, The Myth ofFingerprints, LINGUA FRANCA, Nov. 2000, at 54,
60. Fingerprint examiners' belief that latent fingerprints can be matched to one person to the
exclusion of all others is "the product of probabilistic intuitions widely shared among finger-
print examiners, not of scientific research. There is no justification based on conventional
science, no theoretical model, statistics, or an empirical validation process." Stoney, supra note
15, at 72. If examiners subjected latent fingerprint identification to the kind of scrutiny visited
upon DNA typing, fingerprint identification would have little science to fall back on. "Woe to
fingerprint practice were such criteria applied." Id. In other words: Ipse dixit.
17. For example, it is hard to imagine how one could empirically test the maxim given
earlier by the document examiner at supra note 13.
18. See generally John J. Harris, How Much Do People Write Alike: A Study of Signa-
tres, 48 J. CRIN. L. CRIMINOLOGY& POlICE SCL 647 (1958) (finding that, contrary to apparent
belief of handwriting experts, it is not true that no two people write indistinguishably alike).
57 WASH. &LEE L. REV 879 (2000)
these problems has given pause to the experts or, indeed, to the lawyers or
judges who offer, oppose, and make decisions about the implications of these
problems for the courts' use of such evidence.
Because there is so little research and so little data, forensic identification
scientists, unlike normal scientists, are relatively unconstrained by data-based
knowledge of their field or the phenomena with which their field deals. This
state of affairs allows forensic identification scientists to make exaggerated
claims about the nature of those phenomena and about what the examiners can
deliver. Many of these statements reflect the hopes and dreams of the fields'
founders, but have come to be repeated today as if they were statements of
reality. One of the founders of fingerprint evidence registered precisely this
complaint about the developing field of fingerprint examination.19 One
forensic dentist wrote that bite marks are more precise and more accurate than
fingerprints 20 Fingerprint experts claim that for any given fingerprint identifi-
cation problem, all fingerprint experts would offer exactly the same opinion
(and they will all either reach the correct conclusion or give none at all).2 1
Similarly, an FBI document section chief asserted that all qualified document
examiners would reach the very same conclusion on all document problems.'
Additionally, handwriting experts commonly assert that no two people write
indistinguishably alike (and that no one person writes the same way twice).'
Evidence contradicting the beliefs of forensic science does not seem to
interfere with continued adherence to those beliefs. The dentitions of more
than one suspect have matched crime scene bite marks equally well.24 In a
study done bythe FBI inthe course oflitigation, fingerprint examiners were not
19. See Cole, supra note 16, at 56 ("Faulds complained that 'the popular fiction, that no
two fingers can be alike' was being treated as 'a sober fact of the highest scientific certainty,
but,' he pointed out, 'the only proof of it is seemingly the same 'fact' repeated in other
words .... ).
20. This appeared in a draft, later edited out, of the chapter, Raymond Rawson,Identifica-
lion from Bitemarks, in 2 MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE, supra note 1, § 24 (draft on file with
author).
21. See generally Simon Cole, Witnessing Identification: Latent Fingerprint Evidence
and Expert Knowledge, 28 Soc. STuD. Sci. 687 (1998).
22. See DAVID FISHER, HARD EVIDENCE 196 (1995) (quoting FBI document section chief
Ronald Furgerson as stating that in any given case all "180" "certified" document examiners in
United States would reach same conclusions as he would).
23. But see supra note 17 and accompanying text (noting that some beliefs are untest-
able).
24. See Milone v. Camp, 22 F.3d 693,705 (7th Cir. 1994) (acknowledging that defendant
"has made a credible claim that newly discovered evidence would not only cast a doubt upon
his guilt but would in fact exonerate him'); Lowell Levine, Forensic Dentistry: Our Most
Controversial Case, in LEGAL MEDICN ANNUAL 73 (Cyril Wecht ed., 1978) (discussing
investigation in Milone).
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unanimous in their opinions about the same questioned and known finger-
prints.' Inthe first fingerprintproficiencytests, one-fifth ofthe experts errone-
ously identified the wrong person.26 The only study aimed at testing the hand-
writing question found that "so many of these signatures lacked individuality
and looked alike thatthey were not worth photographing. "27 Proficiency studies
by the Forensic Sciences Foundation and the American Society of Crime
Laboratory Directors have found accuracy to be less than perfect, to varying
degrees, for all forensic identification disciplines. The response of some
members of the fingerprint examiners' community is telling. They continue to
deny that errors can occur, arguing that any study showing errors led to correc-
tion of the problems that led to the errors and is therefore not relevant to the
current state ofthe art, which is presumed to have again become flawless."
By contrast, there are times when fields among the forensic sciences have
proved themselves quite capable of doing research on the subject of their
expertise, correcting erroneous beliefs and procedures, and advancing their
knowledge. One example is the field of fire and arson experts. Most of their
beliefs about indicators of arson were arrived at without the benefit of empiri-
caltesting. But eventually they put these beliefs to the test- by burning down
buildings in which they had simulated both set and accidental fires with the
goal being to determine whether the indicators correlated with the manner in
which the fire began. From these experiments they learned that many of their
beliefs about arson indicators were false.'
Forensic identification examiners have made errors in proficiency testing,
as well as in actual cases.3 Articles reporting data on error rates in forensic
25. See United States v. Mitchell, Crim. No. 96-407-1 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 2000), entering
judgment afterremandfrom 145 F.3d 572 (3d Cir. 1998); infra notes 107-09 and accompanying
text (discussing Mitchell further).
26. David L. Grieve, Possession of Truth, 46 J. FoRENsIC IDENTIICATION 524 (1996).
27. Harris, supra note 18, at 647.
28. Mitchell, Crim. No. 96-407-1 (testimony of Bruce Budowle).
29. Evidence once thought to indicate arson, but later found not to distinguish intentional
fires from accidental fires, includes wide Vs versus narrow Vs, spalling of concrete, crazing of
window glass, char blisters, window sooting or staining, and color of smoke and flame. See
John Lentini, Fires, Arsons and Explosions, in 2 MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE, supra note 1,
§ 26-2.2.1, at 238 (discussing evidence of arson). Yet fire and arson experts, through the
International Association of Arson Investigators, felt themselves to be so lacking in their
scientific foundations that they filed amicus briefs asking courts to exempt them from Daubert.
See Michigan Millers Mut. Ins. Corp. v. Benfield, 140 F.3d 915, 919-20 (11th Cir. 1998)
(discussing scientific basis of arson expert's testimony). The position they argued - that they
were not really doing science after all, and non-science fields should be excused from having
to prove their validity - is one that now has been rejected clearly by Kumho Tire.
30. Non-blind proficiency testing provides estimates of the upper bounds of accuracy,
presumably because examiners do their best when they know they are being tested. P.L. Zajac
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science proficiency testing are cited in the margin." In their book on cases of
DNA exonerations, Scheck, Neufeld, and Dwyer reported on the factors
leading to sixty-two established wrongful convictions.32 These data indicate
fifty-six forensic science errors among those cases, including an erroneous
DNA inclusion, erroneous serology inclusions, and errors from microscopic
hair comparisons. Those do not include twenty-one additional instances of
"defective or fraudulent science.
3
Another source of error is that forensic identification scientists often are
aware of other potentially or irrefutably inculpatory evidence in a case. An
elementary principle of perception is that such cues increase the likelihood
that examiners will resolve ambiguities as consistent with the expectations.3
Often, the bias in the examiner's perception and decision-making is inadver-
tent. But sometimes examiners deliberately misrepresent their own findings
to be consistent with the other evidence3P or seek out other evidence to resolve
their own uncertainties. The Inspector General of the Justice Department
found numerous instances of such practices in the areas of the FBI crime lab
that his office investigated. 6 In another case, a DNA examiner discounted
discrepancies and ambiguities in autorads because she knew that officers
found property ofthe victim in the suspect's apartment 37 In another illustra-
& B.W. Grunbaum, Problems of Reliability in the Phenotyping of Eiythrocyte Acid Phos-
phatase in Bloodstains, 23 J. FORENSIC SCL 615,617 (1978).
31. Seegeneral6yJOSEPEL.PETESONETAL., CRXMELABORAToRYPROICIENCYTESTING
RESEARCH PROGRAM- FINAL REPORT (1978); Joseph L. Peterson & Penelope N. Markham,
Crine LaboratoryProficiency TestingResults, 1978-1991,11: Resolving Questions of Common
Origin, 40 J. FORENSIC SCL 1009 (1995); D. Michael Risinger et aL, Exorcism oflgnorance as
a Proxyfor RationalKnowledge: The Case ofHandwritingIdentification "Expertise," 137 U.
PA. L. REV. 731 (1989).
32. See BARRYSCHECKET AL., ACTUALINNOCENCE 263 (2000) (reporting data on factors
leading to wrongful convictions).
33. For comparison, erroneous eyewitness identifications occurred in 52 cases. Id.
34. On the underlying psychology of this phenomenon from a cognitive perspective, see
UuRic NEISSER, COGNITION AND REA=ITY: PRINCIPLES AND IMPI/CATIONS OF COGNiTIVE
PSYCHOLOGY 43-45 (1976), or, from a signal detection theory perspective, see Victoria L. Phil-
lips et al., TheApplication ofSignalDetection Theory to Decision-Making in Forensic Science,
45 J. FORENSIC SCL - (forthcoming 2000).
35. Andre Moenssens, Novel Scientific Evidence in Civil and Criminal Cases: Some
Words of Caution, 84 J. CR L. & CUMINOLOGY 1,17 (1993) ("All experts aretempted, many
times during their careers, to report positive results when their inquiries came up inconclusive,
or indeed to report a negative result as positive ...
36. OFFICE OF T INSPECTOR GENERAIUNIED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, THE
FBI LABORATORY: ANINVESTIGATIONINTOLABORATORYPRACTICES ANDALLEGEDMISCON-
DUCT IN EXPLOSiVES-RELATED AND OTHER CASES 2.5 (1997) (reporting principal findings and
recommendations).
37. See William C. Thompson, Examiner Bias in Forensic RFLP Analysis, SCL TEST!-
MONY, at http-/www.scientific.org/case-in-pointarficles/thompson/thompsonhtml (last visited
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tion, some bite mark experts wanted to engage in the practice of withholding
their own opinions until the results of DNA testing were available, so that they
could harmonize their own opinions with the DNA results.3"
The most interesting defense offered by or on behalf of forensic identifi-
cation scientists for their failure to develop a sound scientific basis for their
endeavors is an affirmative defense. The argument is that from the nineteenth"
century until recently, courts have not required forensic scientists to do
research to prove the validity oftheir assertions, so it is unfair to demand it of
them now. 9 In other words, their current weak scientific status is to be
excused by their past weak scientific status, which is the fault of the courts.
The idea that there was no need to test the premises of handwriting or finger-
print or firearms identification (and so on) unless and until the courts de-
manded that they be tested is an astonishing notion. In what other field -
medicine, educational testing, aeronautical engineering, psychotherapy -
would experts dream of arguing that testing their ideas and their effectiveness
would or should be done only if the courts require it? Every other field of
supposed scientific endeavor tests things all the time because it is the respon-
sible thing to do, because it is what the science culture is all about. It is also
what the law of evidence long presumed they would do.4°
If these fields have been waiting for the courts to tell them to test, then
perhaps Daubert and Kumho Tire are telling them now. If Daubert and
Kumho Tire are not making such demands, then these fields probably never
will undertake such testing because they have, apparently, been waiting for
courts to tell them to do so.
Oct. 12, 2000) (discussing forensic examiner bias in rape case). It is fine for thejury to take this
into account But such double-counting deprives the jury of the unique contribution of the
scientific evidence; it turns good scientific evidence into junk.
38. To their credit, forensic odontologists have recommended a practice of endeavoring
to remain blind to DNA results. See generally David J. Sweet, Human Bite Marks- Examina-
tion, Recovery andAnatysis, in AMERICAN SOCIETY OF FORENSIC ODONTOLOGY, MANUAL OF
FORENSIC ODONTOLOGY (C. Michael Bowers & Gary Bell eds., 3d ed. 1995).
39. See Orenstein, supra note 1. Orenstein stated that the QDE community has been:
UInfairly criticized ... for failing to develop a rigorous empirical defense of its
theories and methods. Like many forensic disciplines and unlike other scientific
fields that can support research and marketing outside the courtroom, forensic doc-
ument examiners traditionally had not had any particular reason to conduct validity
studies because their testimony was being admitted without them. This may well
be one of the valid criticisms of the Frye regime, but it is not a basis for arguing
that QDE evidence is [inadmissible].
li'
40. The central assumption of the test articulated in Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013,
1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923), is that courts can trust scientific fields to verify their own knowledge
before accepting it. If the fields verified their own knowledge, then the courts could defer to
the conclusions of the fields when making their own admission or exclusion decisions.
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IV The Courts' Reception of These Fields Prior to Daubert
Unfortunately, as a result of the tradition and education of lawyers and
judges, they are poorly prepared to evaluate the claims of forensic science, or
any empirical claims. Lawyers and judges come from the world of literary
interpretation, not from the world of empirical testing. 1 To illustrate, I once
began a course on research methodology and statistics for judges with the
following problem. Suppose there are two different techniques for rejoining
a length of intestine after a surgeon excises a diseased portion. Within the
field of gastrointestinal surgery, two methods of rejoining were being
debated - inverting versus everting. How could one determine which method
is, indeed, better? The judges in my classroom were seriously stumped. One
finally, and sheepishly, suggested: 'You could ask an expert."42
Accordingly, the history of the admission of forensic identification
science in American courts is remarkably barren of serious examinations of
the data (or lack of data) underlying the claims of various fields. The pre-
Daubert courts generally paid so little attention to the theoretical and empiri-
cal support on which an asserted expertise might stand that post-Daubert
courts often will have no choice but to start over at the beginning. This
certainly is true concerning the early admissibility of fingerprint expert
evidence.43 Part ofthe problem is that the courts lacked sufficient skepticism.
From the beginning, the uniqueness of fingerprint patterns was so widely
assumed that it never seemed necessary to prove it. And part of the problem
is that judges lacked skill at knowing how to subject empirical claims to
scrutiny. In 1911, the first state supreme court to consider the admissibility
of fingerprint experts relied on the assertions, unsupported by data, of several
expert witnesses in fingerprint identification. The expert witnesses vouched
for their own technique's validity and their own expertise." In addition, the
court cited two general encyclopedias, three treatises on crime investigation
methods, and one English case.4" Later courts did no better. And soon courts
41. "[The intellectual life of the whole of western society is increasingly being split into
two polar groups .... Literary intellectuals at one pole - at the other scientists .... Between
the two a gulf of mutual incomprehension...." C.P. SNOW, THE Two CuLTuREs AND THE
SCIENTFc REVOLUTrON 4 (1959).
42. Iwould like to thinkthat most citizens would recall whattheyweretaughtinjunior high
school about designing experiments: Scientists randomly perform one technique on one half of
the patients and perform the other technique on the otherhalf and then compare the outcomes.
43. See 2 FAIGMAN ET AL, supra note 1, § 21-1.0, at 51-55 (discussing fingerprint
evidence).
44. See People v. Jennings, 96 N.E. 1077, 1082 (Ill. 1911) (discussing expert testimony
regarding fingerprints).
45. See id. at 1081 (noting that no U.S. court had ruled on admissibility of fingerprint
evidence but pointing to ancient origins of identification system).
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could find fingerprint expertise to be sound simply by citing other courts.
Ironically, Henry Faulds, one of the pioneers of the use of fingerprints in the
field of criminal identification, complained that 'the popular fiction, that no
two fingers can be alike" was being treated as "a sober fact of the highest
scientific certainty" for no reason other than that people kept repeating that
i"fact '4  In 1943, proponents of fingerprint uniqueness were forced, by their
own unsuccessful efforts to prove that proposition true, to acknowledge that
there still was no solid evidence or theory to support the conclusion, but only
subjective impressions and faith.' But the courts had been sold on it long
before.
Once courts accepted fingerprint identification, proponents of other
asserted fields of forensic science availed themselves of the law's principal
tool of reasoning: analogy. Every other field could claim that the phenome-
non central to its claimed expertise was 'Just like fingerprints."
The story of asserted handwriting identification expertise is long and has
been told at length.' It will suffice to quote from one of the most searching
legal commentaries on the subject:
The story in the United States is even more complex. Unilthe passage
of the English statute, most Americanjurisdictions followed Englishprac-
tice and rejected such expertise. There were some significant exceptions,
however. In the 1836 case of Moody v. Rowell, Massachusetts became the
first common law jurisdiction to authorize the use of such asserted exper-
tise. The rationale oftheMoody case is telling.... [W]ithout evaluating
the validity of the proffered experts' claims to expertise, the Moody Court
ruled that such asserted expert testimony should be admitted because it
could not be any worse than what was traditionally relied on. This seems
to be the dominant rationale for the allowance of such testimony in those
states which followed Massachusetts' lead over the next fifty to seventy-
five years. While by 1900 a substantial majority ofAmericanjurisdictions
accepted such testimony, the prevailing attitude may be best exemplified
by the opinion of the New York Court of Appeals in Hoag v. Wright,
where the court said:
The opinions of experts upon handwriting, who testify from com-
parison only, are regarded by the courts as of uncertain value,
because in so many cases where such evidence is received wit-
46. Cole, .supra note 16, at 56.
47. See HAROLD CUMIS & CIARLEsbMIDLO, FNGERPRNTS, PAMS AND SOLES 149
(1943) (conceding that "[c]omplete observational proof that prints from two fingers are never
identical is unattainable").
48. See D. Michael Risinger, Handwriting Idenification, in 2 MODERN SCIENTIFIC
EVIDENCE, supra note 1, §§ 22-1.0 to 22-1.5, at 80-89 (discussing history of handwriting identi-
fication).
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nesses of equal honesty, intelligence and experience reach conclu-
sions not only diametrically opposite, but always in favor of the
party who called them.
While some courts continued to reject such expertise, and most which
allowed it remained skeptical, a group ofprofessional experts was growing
up and beginning to seek greater respectability...
The ultimate triumph of this vision was finally insured by the Lind-
bergh Baby kidnapping case, State v. Hauptmann, in 1936. Osborn was
the chief witness called to testily that Bruno Richard Hauptmann had
written all ofthe ransom notes found or sent after the abduction of the son
of Charles A. Lindbergh. The public seemed to need to believe Haupt-
mann was guilty, wanted him convicted, and was grateful to those who
supplied the evidence. Osbormbecame a celebrity. In the fftyyears after
the afrmance of Hauptmann, no reported opinion rejected handwriting
expertise, norwasmuchskepticismdisplayedtowardsit Rather, itbecame
universally accepted as scientific and dependable.'
Except for an intriguing pair of cases in the State of Washington, the
claim that toolmarks are unique and can unerringly link a crime scene mark
to a tool in the possession of a suspect "to the exclusion of all others in the
world" has gone virtually unremarked upon by the courts - and, presumably,
unchallenged by defense counsel State v. Clark0 was decided six months
after the Washington Supreme Court reaffirmed its holding in State v. Fasick51
concerning the claim of uniqueness of knife blade striations, which stated that
"[y]ou could not tell in a thousand years whether the two pieces were cut by
the same knife.152 But the Clark court came to the opposite conclusion,
holding that the toohuark comparisons "conclusively establish[ed]" the iden-
tity between the crime scene knife and the suspect's knife. 3 The court offered
no explicit explanation for its 180-degree change of view, nor can much
illumination be drawn from the briefs submitted in the case. The relevant
facts were essentially the same in both cases; the critical circumstantial evi-
dence was the same (branches cut with a knife); the expert was the same
person; and the same arguments were offered (namely, the multiplication rule
of probability theory used as a metaphor to argue that the likelihood of a
coincidental match was small or nonexistent).' And though the personnel of
the court changed, the change was insufficient to account for the change of
49. Id. § 22-1.3, at 82-85.
50. 287 P. 18 (Wash. 1930).
51. 270 P. 123 (Wash. 1928).
52. State v. Fasick, 270 P. 123,124 (Wash. 1928).
53. State v. Clark, 287 P. 18,20 (Wash. 1930).
54. Id. at 20-21; Fasick, 270 P. at 124-25.
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votes (because the turnaround required some justices who rejected the argu-
ments for toolmark identification in Fasick to accept those very same argu-
ments in Clark). If the explanation is to be found in the nature of the crimes
being prosecuted - murder of an unsavory person versus rape of a teenager -
then we can only wonder what passed for legal reasoning in these cases.
Because, thereafter, Clark was precedent for the admissibility of toolmark
evidence in all courts in Washington state and, though that case was not cited
by other state supreme courts, for sixty years there was not a single other
judicial opinion questioning the validity oftoolmark identification.55
If one does a synthesis of voiceprint admissibility cases, here is what one
finds: First, overtime, no consensus developed about whether courts through-
out the nation admitted or excluded claims of expertise in identifying voices
using spectrographic analysis. Second, courts widely used the Frye test to
evaluate admissibility, and whether the analysis led to admission or exclusion
depended entirely on which version of Frye the court used - the narrow
version (voiceprint practitioners alone were the reference population of
experts) or the broad version (the views of experts from related relevant fields
were included in the reference population).56 The narrow version never led
to exclusion. The broad version never led to admission.57 Third, in 1979,
after the National Academy of Sciences published an unfavorable review of
the state of the science, the FBI ceased offering voice identification expert
testimony in court. But that report had virtually no impact on the appellate
opinions decided after its release. The pattern of admission and exclusion
remained desultory. Indeed, after publication of that important review of the
science, very few cases even cited it. 8
The first reported case of identification by bite mark comparison was
Doyle v. State,59 in which someone at the crime scene had bitten into a piece
of cheese and the government argued that the bite mark matched the dentition
of the defendant." The defense did not challenge the government's use of the
bite mark as identifying circumstantial evidence on scientific grounds, though
scientists did not conduct relevant research on the subject of bite mark identi-
fication for another two decades.61 The first meaningful case involving bite
55. 2 FAIGV ET AL.,supra note 1, § 23-1.1, at 126.
56. See Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923) (stating that expert
testimony must be generally accepted "in the particular field in which it belongs").
57. See 2 FAIGMANET AL, supra note 1, § 25-1.0, at 190 (presenting relevant cases).
58. See id. (presenting relevant cases).
59. 263 S.W.2d 779 (Tex. Crim. App. 1954).
60. See Doyle v. State, 263 S.W.2d 779, 779 (Tex. Crim. App. 1954) (determining that
defendant's compliance with sheriff's request to bite cheese is not confession).
61. See 2 FAIGMANET AL.,supra note1, § 24-1.0, at 158 (discussing Doyle).
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mark identification - meaningful because there was a challenge to the science,
which forced the court to write an opinion - was People v. Marx. 2 This case
began to end the controversy among forensic dentists, who to this point had
refrained from offering identification testimony in criminal cases. But the
experts described the dentition at issue in Marx as highly unusual, which
made it an exception to the field's great hesitation to offering an inculpatory
identification.63 The appellate court turned aside a Kelly-Frye challenge by
ignoring the logic and data underlying the identification and instead focusing
on the instruments used, holding that dental materials and photography were
not novel.' The court turned away a rare (but pertinent) challenge under the
famed California case of People v. Collins" by concluding that the experts
had not obtained, calculated, or relied on any probability data in reaching their
conclusions.6 Though the expert offered bite mark testimony in Marx be-
cause the particular dentition in the case was highly unusual, making it an
exception to the uncertainty that dominated the field, the case nevertheless
became precedent for the admission of bite mark evidence involving all kinds
of dentition. 7
A year later, in the Illinois case of People v. Milone, the number of
forensic dentists who testified that their field had not yet achieved the ability
to confidently link a suspect to a crime using dentition exceeded the number
who testified that they did have the expertise - reflecting the field's heretofore
cautious stance.69 But the court ruled that what it heard was sufficient to
62. 126 Cal. Rptr. 350 (Cal. Ct. App. 1975).
63. See People v. Marx, 126 Cal. Rptr. 350,354 (Cal. Ct. App. 1975) (relating testimony
of expert that bite marks in question were extraordinarily distinct and defined).
64. See id. at 356 (describing techniques used by experts in their testimony as novel but
not instruments and materials employed).
65. 438 P.2d 33 (Cal. 1968). In People v. Collins, a case found in nearly every evidence
casebook, the California Supreme Court held that probability evidence was inadmissible to
prove guilt when it consisted of: (a) speculative probabilities (rather than known relative fre-
quencies of the attributes at issue), (b) a lack of proof that the attributes of interest consisted of
independent events, and (c) invalid conclusions of rarity inferred from the probability calcula-
tion, which were suggested to the jury as establishing proof beyond a reasonable doubt People
v. Collins, 438 P,2d 33,38-40 (Cal. 1968).
66. Marx, 126 Cal. Rptr. at 357. When applying Collins, one might have thought that
courts would mark non-existent or fabricated data, involving an unknown assumption of
independence, as evidence prime for exclusion, not admission. The Marx court apparently
misread Collins as rejecting the application of probability theory and not as rejecting poor data
that were poorly analyzed.
67. See 2 FAIGmANET AL., supra note 1, § 24-1.0, at 159 (discussingMarx).
68. 356 N.E.2d 1350 (Ill. App. Ct. 1976).
69. See People v. Milone, 356 N.E,2d 1350, 1356 (Ill. App. Ct. 1976) (finding expert
testimony about bite mark identification admissible).
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Constitute "general acceptance. ''70 In addition, the court cited the cases ofDoyle
v. State71 (which had no data), Patterson v. State72 (which relied on Doyle),
andMarx (which was a case of extremely unusual dentition) as support for its
conclusion.73 Looking back after the defendant completed his term of impris-
onment, there is good reason to believe that Milone was not the killer but that
one Macek was. 74 The admissibility of bite mark identification expert testi-
mony is one of those topsy-turvy events in legal history, in which the experts
in a scientific field did not convince the courts of their expertise, but instead,
the courts convinced the experts. Though once a singularly cautious field,
Moenssens, Starrs, Henderson, and Inbau say that there is no longer any limit
to what some forensic dentists will assert and testify.
75
The courts' treatment of these fields of asserted expertise illuminates the
contrast between the traditional approach to factfinding in courts and the
scientific approach to factfinding. The scientific method involves doing an
empirical study, ifpossible an experiment or many experiments such as on the
question of inverting versus everting intestines at the point where they are
rejoined? 6 The outcomes of empirical studies, and only the outcomes of such
studies, provide answers to the questions of the merit, or even the very exis-
tence, of expertise on some empirical phenomenon. The judicial method, on
the other hand, considers the precedents of sister jurisdictions (what other
judges thought), degree of accord among the experts (general acceptance),
credibility (the expert witness's demeanor on the witness stand), judicial
intuition (guesswork), and reasonableness and plausibility. For the task at
hand, the courts' tools have the unfortunate quality of being reassuring at the
same time that they are virtually useless for evaluating empirical claims. All
of them are shortcuts at best, and evasions at worst, because each avoids
cutting to the heart of the empirical claims. They remain on the sidelines of
the issue by asking what others think or seem to think about something, rather
than seeking to learn directly about the thing at issue.
70. Id. at 1358-60.
71. 263 S.W.2d 779 (Tex Crim. App. 1954).
72. 509 S.W.2d 857 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974).
73. Milone, 356 N.E.2d at 1359; see Patterson v. State, 509 S.W.2d 857, 862-63 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1974) (allowing admission of testimony regarding bite mark comparisons); Doyle
v. State, 263 S.W.2d 779,779-80 (Tex. Crim. App. 1954) (allowing bite mark evidence).
74. See Milone v. Camp, 22 F.3d 693, 701 (7th Cir. 1994) (concluding that defendant
could not get relief in habeas corpus proceeding by arguing actual innocence with newly dis-
covered evidence), cer. denied, 513 U.S. 1076 (1995).
75. ANDRE MoENssENs ET AT-, SCIENnFc EVIDENCE IN CIM AND CRMTAL CASES
§ 16.07, at 985 (4th ed. 1995).
76. See supra note 42 and accompanying text (discussing scientific method).
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Daubert and Kumho Tire direct courts to think about empirical problems
in a manner that resembles the way scientists look at the same kinds of ques-
tions and thereby represent an important departure from the courts' traditional
approach to these problems.
V The Law's Treatment of These Fields After Daubert
As noted earlier, the conscientious application of Daubert to the forensic
identification sciences would lead to significant limitations on their admissi-
bility." One illustration of this is Williamson v. Reynolds,"8 in which, in a
habeas corpus proceeding, a federal district court found hair and fiber identifi-
cation to be so unreliable (or of such undemonstrated reliability) that it was
deemed inadmissible. 9 Before retrial, after twelve years on death row, courts
exonerated the defendants with DNA evidence.8"
The Williamson case has been an exception. The largest reason that
courts have not applied Daubert to proffered forensic identification evidence
is that opponents fail to challenge the admission of the proffered evidence, at
least in the criminal courts.8' Though Daubert fundamentally changed the
terms of engagement, with a few exceptions, defense lawyers across the nation
seemed not to notice.
In the post-Daubert, pre-Kumho Tire period, a variety ofjudicial strate-
gies saved forensic identification from exclusion. In the case of United States
v. Starzecpyzel, in which a forensic document examiner (FDE) was proffered
to testify as to the genuineness of a signature, the court wrote: 'Were the
Court to apply Daubert to the proffered FDE testimony, it would have to be
excluded. This conclusion derives from a straightforward analysis of the
77. DNA typing is the clear exception because good basic science constitutes its founda-
tion and facilitates its day to day applications.
78. 904 F. Supp. 1529 (ElD. Okla. 1995).
79. See Williamson v. Reynolds, 904 F. Supp. 1529, 1558 (E.D. Okla. 1995) (describing
unreliability of hair and fiber identification evidence). The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals
reversed that portion of the case, finding that "the district court applied the wrong standard in
ruling that the hair analysis evidence was inadmissible." Williamson v. Ward, 110 F.3d 1508,
1522 (10thCir. 1997). The appellate court held that on federal habeas review the issue was due
process, not the substantive decision under Daubert determining whether the expert evidence
was admissible, Ma
80. The Williamson case provides the subtitle of Scheck, Dwyer, and Neufeld's book,
"Five Days to Execution .... " See generally SCHECKET AL, supra note 32. The actual killer
turned out to be the government's star witness against Ronald Williamson and his co-defendant
Dennis Fritz. IML at 148-55.
81. See generally D. Michael Risinger, Navigating Expert Reliability: The Supreme
CourtAlters the SaiingDirectons, But Where Is the Fleet?, 64 ALB. L. REV. 99 (2000).
82. 880 F. Supp. 1027 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
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suggestedDaubert factors.... "" But the court's reasoning was more convo-
luted, finding that because FDEs flunked Daubert's test, they are not scien-
fists. Because they are not scientists, they are not subject to Daubert. There-
fore, the testimony is admissible (under a test of judicial intuition about their
reliability). This perfectly circular reasoning - much like saying a student is
exempted from taking a test precisely because the student is incapable of
passing it - was copied by other courts that faced the same issue."s
Another strategy assumed that Daubert applies only to novel evidence.
Although Daubert is explicit in saying that the test of admissibility of expert
evidence under the federal rules applies equally to non-novel as to novel
evidence,"s it is remarkable how many lower court judges excused themselves
from their gatekeeping duties by reading Daubert (or perhaps by not reading
Daubert) to apply only to novel scientific evidence. 6
83. United States v. Starzecpyzel, 880 F. Supp. 1027,1036 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
84. See United States v. Jones, 107 F3d 1147,1159-61 (6th Cir. 1997) (finding handwrit-
ing expertise admissible but not subject to Daubero; United States v. Velasquez, 64 F.3d 844,
850-52 (3d Cir. 1995) (finding handwriting expert testimony to be non-scientific and therefore
using Daubert tests as guidelines only); United States v. Ruth, 42 MJ. 730, 732-33 (AL Ct.
Crim. App. 1995) (finding handwriting analysis non-scientific for Daubert purposes).
85. "[We do not read the requirements of Rule 702 to apply specially or exclusively to
unconventional evidence. Of course, well-established propositions are less likely to be chal-
lenged than those that are novel, and they are more handily defended." Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 592 n.ll (1993).
86. A number of courts mistakenly have assumed that Daubert applies only to novel
science. See Jugle v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 975 F. Supp. 576, 580 (D. Vt. 1997) (holding
that expert opinion on cause of car fire differed from kind of novel science at issue in Daubert
and therefore was not subject to Dauberf s scrutiny and finding methodology of experts accep-
table while barely describing it); Polizzi Meats, Inc. v. Aetna Life & Casualty Co., 931 F. Supp.
328, 336 (DN.J. 1996) (reacing to plaintiffs argument that fire and arson experts were subject
to Daubert by stating that "[t]his astounding contention is based on a seriously flawed reading
of the United States Supreme Court's decision in [Daubert]. Daubert addresses the standards
to be applied by a trial judge when faced with a proffer of expert scientific testimony based
upon a novel theory or methodology"); State v. Cline, 909 P.2d 1171, 1177 (Mont. 1996)
(limiting Daubert's application to novel scientific evidence). In Cline the court stated:
[W]e do not consider fingerprint evidence in general to be novel scientific evi-
dence. However, in the present case the issue is whether it is possible to determine
the age of a fingerprint utilizing magnetic powder. We apply the Daubert standard
to this case because we consider fingerprint aging techniques in this context to be
novel scientific evidence. Certainly all scientific expert testimony is not subject to
the Daubert standard and the Daubert test should only be used to determine the
admissibility ofnovel scientific evidence.
Id.; see also State v. Hodgson, 512 N.W.2d 95, 98 (GMnn. 1994) (concluding that even were
Minnesota to adopt Daubert, it would have no impact on admissibility of bite marks because
"we are satisfied that basic bite-mark analysis by a recognized expert is not a novel or emerging
type of scientific evidence").
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Yet another tactic assumed that the Federal Rules of Evidence, and there-
fore Daubert, were more liberal and therefore had to throw open the gates
wider than Frye had." If one looks at what Daubert actually does, and not at
what courts and commentators have assumed about it, one discovers that Frye
and Daubert will lead a gatekeeper to the same conclusion regarding most
expert evidence. However, certain kinds of evidence will be excluded more
readily, under Frye and other kinds of evidence will be excluded more readily
under Daubert. For example, courts evaluating evidence based on sound
science, but that is so cutting edge that there has been no opportunity for a field
to become acquainted with it, will exclude it under Frye but will admit it under
Daubert. Obversely, Frye, but not Daubert, admits proffered testimony that is
well accepted within its field, but which nevertheless relies on poor science.
Courts have saved some testimony from exclusion by treating the self-
designation by experts as to which of the prongs of Federal Rule of Evidence
702 - scientific, technical, or other - was dispositive in determining the level
of scrutiny they should receive. Thus, in Michigan Millers Mutuallnsurance
Corp. v. Benfield s8 the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals found the testimony
of an arson expert inadmissible because he made the mistake of calling himself
a scientist and the substance of the testimony flunked Daubert."9 But a fire
marshal could give his opinion onthe cause ofa fire because he had not claimed
the mantle of science, and therefore did not flunk Daubert.' Thus, the court
admitted the fire marshal's testimony as technical or other expert opinion."
Another method courts used to admit testimony was to accept so-called
"experience" as a substitute for systematic empirical knowledge. Experience
with some acquired skills or knowledge might well suffice for offering opin-
87. See United States v. Jones, 107 F.3d 1147,1158 (6th Cir. 1997) ("Such a result [that
is, excluding asserted "science" of handwriting identification that had for a century been
admitted] truly would turn Daubert, a case intended to relax the admissibility requirements for
expert scientific evidence, on its head."); United States v. Kwong, 69 F.3d 663, 668 (2d Cir.
1995) (stating on issue concerning polygraph evidence that Federal Rules of Evidence are
"concededly more liberal than the Frye test"); Borawick v. Shay, 68 F.3d 597, 610 (2d Cir.
1995) ("[B]y loosening the strictures on scientific evidence set byFrye, Daubert reinforces the
idea that there should be a presumption of admissibility of evidence."); United States v. Bonds,
12 F.3d 540, 568 (6th Cir. 1993) (finding that DNA typing "easily meets the more liberal test
set out... inDaubert"); State v. Cline, 909 P.2d 1171, 1177 (Mont 1996) (stating in opinion
involving fingerprint identification that "we rejected the 'general acceptance' test, holding that
it was not in conformity with the spirit of the new rules of evidence").
88. 140 F.3d 915 (llth Cir. 1998).
89. See Michigan Millers Mut Ins. Corp. v. Benfield, 140 F.3d 915,921 (11th Cir. 1998)
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ions on certain kinds of factual questions in a trial. But to think that experi-
ence suffices for reaching sound determinations about causation (for example,
the general causation of cancer) or dependable linkages of suspects to crime
scenes (for example, much of the forensic identification sciences) is to sus-
pend critical thought. Casual experience is a weak form of a empirical testing;
courts tempted to regard it as sufficient need a better epistemological theory
than they have spoken of so far.'
In other cases, the superficiality of the scrutiny given to the proffered
expert testimony saved the evidence from exclusion. This is well illustrated
by the case of State v. Coon,93 a challenge to voiceprint expertise and the case
by which Alaska adopted Daubert as state law. 4 The Alaska Supreme Court
noted the greater scrutiny courts would be expected to give to expert evidence
offerings under Daubert than under Frye.' At the trial court's hearing, the
proponents ofthe evidence offered no research data or studies in support ofthe
expertise.' The trial court neither asked the parties for evidence with some
substanceto it, nor did it carry out any library research ofits own.' It was that
meager record that the Alaska Supreme Court reviewed, did no further re-
search on, remanded for no further inquiry, and upheld." As far as can be told
from the opinions, none of these courts was aware of the National Academy
of Sciences review of the insufficient science underlying voice spectrography.
All were content to base their decisions on the more or less unsupported
testimony of the testifying voiceprint expert.' The Alaska Supreme Court's
opinion states, "[N]o scientific literature was submitted to the trial court for
review, but [the voice identification expert] testified about several articles and
studies addressing voice spectrographic analysis, and conceded that the
reliability of the technique was disputed among members of the relevant
scientific community."" ° Thus, nothing was inthe record to cite. The opinion
92. See generally D. Michael Risinger, Preliminary Thoughts on a Functional Taxonomy
of Expertise, in 3 MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE, supra note 1, § 34, at 1-20 (classifying
eperts by type).
93. 974 P.2d 386 (Alaska 1999).
94. See State v. Coon, 974 P.2d 386, 394 (Alaska 1999) (establishing Daubert standards
in Alaska courts).
95. See id. at 395-96 (noting possible "substantial" burden that may be imposed upon trial
and appellatejudges in applying Daubert factors to novel scientific evidence).
96. Id. at 402 (stating that "[a]lithough it is not clear that voice spectrographic analysis has
attained general acceptance within the relevant scientific community, we do not find that the
trial court clearly erred in making its general acceptance finding").
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gives a more detailed recitation of the expert's background than it does the
data on the underpinnings of the technique at issue (for which any facts about
the particular expert are irrelevant). Despite the Coon court's own discussion
of the heightened analysis of the science that was called for under a Daubert
review, it found entirely adequate a review of the scientific claims that would
have had trouble earning a passing grade in ajunior college science class.
One can only be struck by how vacuous so much ofthe judicial reasoning
has been during the post-Daubert, pre-Kumho Tire period. This suggests that
judges have been forced into an area where they are both seriously lost and
have nary a clue as to how to conduct a meaningful review of empirical
claims. Thus, the preferred decision-making and opinion-writing strategy has
been to find ways to avoid coming to grips with the problem before them.
VI. Future Judicial Treatment of These Fields After Kumho Tire
This is an era we have onlyjust entered, and so anything said about it will
be no more than an educated guess and must be offered tentatively. Kumho
Tire plugs a major hole that lower court judges created in Daubert. Now,
courts must evaluate challenges to all fields of asserted expertise by using
appropriate criteria. Where the proffered expertise is of an empirical nature,
the usual scientific criteria are entirely appropriate. Thus, courts should
consider whether the field in question has made an effort to test its claims or
has assiduously avoided finding out which of its claims are true and which are
not. Indeed, where ithas made few or no efforts, the Daubert criteria are allthe
more illuminating.
Daubert and Kumho Tire demand of judges a powerful new way of
thinking about evidence of the real world - not new for scientists, of course,
or for serious scholars of almost every kind, but new for many courts. The
power ofjudicial inertia, the judicial distaste for having to learn new ways of
thinking, is deep. The intellectual energy and creativity ofjudges are far more
likely to be employed in finding ways to avoid having to engage scientific and
empirical issues in a serious way. Perhaps judges will find new holes to
escape through and the Supreme Court will have to find new plugs with which
to fill those holes.
Gatekeepers at the trial level might, on the other hand, begin to reflect
more regularly the example of the district court in Boston which decided
United States v. Hines,'01 the first forensic document examination case de-
cided after Kumho Tire."° In the light of Kumho Tire, this court did apply
101. 55 F. Supp. 2d 62 (D. Mass. 1999).
102. See United States v. Hrines, 55 F. Supp. 2d 62,66 (D. Mass. 1999) (stating that Kumho
Tire extended Daubert factors to cover non-scientific fields).
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Daubert to asserted handwriting identification expertise' ° and found the opin-
ion testimony of document examiners purporting to identify the author of a
writing to be inadmissible, stating, "There are no meaningful, and accepted
validity studies in the field."' e4 A number of courts quickly followed this
holding.105 In short, these courts saw the same lack of a scientific foundation
for the asserted expertise that the Starzecpyzel court did, but directed by
Kumho Tire to apply Daubert, these courts found they had to exclude the
proffered expert opinion.
In marked contrast is the performance of a federal district court in Phila-
delphia, which heard the first substantive challenge to the foundational claims
of fingerprint identification made in many decades - indeed, the most substan-
tive challenge ever heard in an American court."°6 At the Daubert hearing for
United States v. Mitchell,"°7 both the proponent and the opponent offered
briefs, witnesses, and arguments that provided the court with serious informa-
tion about the strengths and the weaknesses of the claims of fingerprint
identification."8 But the district judge made no written order or opinion, nor
103. Compare id. at 66-71 (extending Daubertto handwriting analysis) with United States
v. Starzecpyzel, 880 F. Supp. 1027, 1036 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (refusing to apply Daubert to
forensic document examination because it found handwriting identification to be non-scientific).
See also supra notes 82-83 and accompanying text (discussing Starzecpyel).
104. Hines, 55 F. Supp. 2d at 69.
105. See, e.g., United States v. Rutherford, 104 F. Supp. 2d 1190, 1194 (D. Neb. 2000)
(finding that forensic document examiner's testimony must be limited to explaining similarities
and differences between questioned documents and known handwriting samples); United States
v. Santillan, No. CR-96-40169, 1999 WL 1201765, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 3, 1999) (agreeing
with Hines's reasoning to exclude testimony of handwriting expert as to authorship of docu-
ment); United States v. Brown, No. CR 99-184 ABC (C.D. Cal. Dec. 1, 1999) (unpublished
order, on file with Washington and Lee Law Review) (allowing testimony by handwriting expert
on similarity of defendant's handwriting to questioned documents, but not allowing any
conclusions on actual authorship).
106. See Cole, supra note 16, at 60 (detailing expert testimony issues in United States v.
Mitchell, Crim. No. 96-407-1 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 2000)); Letter from Robert Epstein, Assistant
Federal Defender, Federal Community Defender Office for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania,
to author (Jan. 20, 2000) (on file with author) (discussing court's ruling).
107. Crim. No. 96-407-1 (ED. Pa. Feb. 2000).
108. See United States v. Mitchell, Crim. No. 96-407-1 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 2000). Prompted
by this case, at the very end of twentieth century, the FBI fingerprint section initiated studies
to demonstrate the validity of traditional claims about fingerprint identification. That fact alone
should terrifiy a court. Why couldn't they bring in the hundreds of studies that ought to exist
to support their claims of the past century? Because few were ever done. Because they do not
exist. The data were disconcerting - as labs in all 50 states were sent the trial evidence and did
not all come back with the same conclusions. The FBI re-sent the evidence to those labs that
reached a differing opinion, pointing out what the FBI thought the conclusion should be. The
labs changed their minds. See Cole, supra note 16, at 58-59 (discussing events in Mitchell);
Epstein, supra note 106 (same).
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did he offer any verbal explanation for his finding of evidentiary reliability.
He merely stated his conclusions from the bench: That the fingerprint expert
testimony was admissible and that its probative value outweighed its prejudi-
cial impact.
At the point of collision between traditional, widespread, unthinking
acceptance ofthe claims of fingerprint identification expertise and the require-
ment of scientific (or other reasoned) gatekeeping as a precondition to admis-
sion of expert evidence, this court did little more than to find a place to hide.
The absence of an explanation prevents an appellate court from being able to
evaluate the district court's gatekeeping, prevents sister courts from learning
from whatever this court learned about the subject matter, and insures that
other courts will revisit this issue on other occasions. Furthermore, the
Mitchell court ignored that the fundamental source of judicial legitimacy in
our system is the giving of reasons for important decisions.
Hines and Mitchell may represent the two extremes of judicial response
in the wake of Kumho Tire - accepting the sometimes difficult duty to decide
versus evasion of the duty. It is hard to believe that the requirements of
Daubert and Kumho Tire are satisfied by replacing ipse dixit by experts with
ipse dixit by judges.
